Abstract: The U
INTRODUCTION
Even before the U.S. Constitution was amended to add the Bill of Rights, it protected habeas corpus, insisting that the "Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."' Yet when we consider the Suspension Clause together with three other constitutional principles, we find a constitutional puzzle. Pursuant to the Madisonian Compromise, inferior federal courts are constitutionally optional. Although the Constitution requires a Supreme Court, it grants Congress the authority to decide whether there shall be inferior federal courts. 251 [Vol. 46:251 cases allocated to it by Article III. 3 As a result, the vast majority of cases within the scope of federal jurisdiction under Article III cannot be heard by the Supreme Court unless those cases are brought originally in some other court, Apart from the rather small number of "Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party," the Supreme Court cannot hear a case unless that case first has been brought in some other court. Finally, pursuant to Tarble's Case, state courts lack authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to determine the legality of federal custody.° A person in federal custody cannot secure release by use of a writ of habeas corpus issued from a state court.°C an these four principles coexist? Consider a case in which an individual is taken into custody by the federal executive and desperately wants to challenge the legality of that detention in court. And suppose that Congress exercised its power under the Madisonian Compromise not to create (or to abolish) inferior federal courts. The detainee obviously could not seek a writ of habeas corpus from non-existent courts. If the detainee were to petition the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, the Court constitutionally would be obligated under Mar&ury to dismiss the petition as outside its limited original jurisdiction.? If the detainee were to seek habeas relief from a state court, Tarble's Case would require that court to dismiss the petition. As a result, the detainee would find that there is no court with jurisdiction in habeas corpus. That is, even though Congress, the Supreme Court, and the state court all acted in compliance with the Constitution, the detainee would have nowhere to obtain a writ of habeas corpus, and in effect, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus would be suspended. Are these" four constitutional principles in hopeless conflict?
Wrestling with this constitutional puzzle is not simply an exercise in constitutional aesthetics or intellectual tidiness. As Professor Lucas Powe recently has suggested, we may be headed for a new constitutional order:
Instead of welfare reform being the characteristic statute and whether Alabama can be sued for not accommodating its disabled employees being the characteristic constitutional ques-tion, the USA Patriot Act might become the paradigmatic statute, and the availability of habeas corpus to individuals held in federal custody without being criminally charged might become the paradigmatic constitutional issue. 8
In the October 2003 Term, the Supreme Court decided three habeas cases challenging executive detention. 9 One of the most striking things about the three decisions, however, is how little they decided and how much they left to future decisions.w In these circumstances, it is important to attempt to solve the constitutional puzzle of habeas corpus.
It is possible that the puzzle simply cannot be solved. Perhaps these four constitutional principles are in hopeless conflict, and one of the 8 L.A. Powe, jr" The Not- So-Brave New Constitutional Order, 117 himtv. L. REV. 647, 684-85 (2003) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL, ORDER (2003)) (footnotes omitted).
9 See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 , 2715 (2004 (holding that the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York lacked jurisdiction because the immediate custodian of the petitioner was located in South Carolina); Rasul v, Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 , 2699 (2004 (holding that federal habeas jurisdiction extends to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba); liamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S, Ct. 2633 , 2639 (2004 (holding that due process requires that the petitioner, a citizen of the United States, be given an opportunity to contest the 'actual basis for his detention). 10 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Unanswered Questions, 7 GREEN BAG 2u 323, 323-24 (2004) .
Indeed, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has observed, LW] hat seems most distinctive about October Term 2003 was how much the
Court left open-how many questions it left unanswered. Sometimes this was because the Court did not reach the merits of important legal issues, such as by dismissing on jtirisdictional grounds " . jose Padilla's claim that the Bush administration lacks authority to detain him as an enemy combatant. Sometimes the Court ruled narrowly because only a limited issue was before it, such as in the Court's holding that the Guantanamo detainees have a right to be heard in federal court, but not addressing the question of what form of hearing they must be given.
cannot think of any recent Supreme Court Term where so much was left undecided. All of these issues now will be faced by the state courts and the lower federal courts. Ultimately, almost all of these questions will return to the Supreme Court in the years ahead for further clarification.
Boston College Law lieuiew (Vol. 46:25 l four must be jettisoned. Perhaps Congress is obligated, despite the Madisonian Compromise, to create inferior federal courts. Perhaps Marbury is wrong, and Congress can add to the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Perhaps Tarble's Case is wrong, and state courts are not forbidden constitutionally from determining the legality of federal custody. Perhaps the Suspension Clause does not protect against the elimination of habeas corpus, but only against its temporary suspension.
All of these possibilities have been suggested by others, and this Article discusses them below. ] ' This Article, however, suggests that it is possible for all four principles to coexist. Such coexistence is important, not because it is likely that Congress will abolish the inferior federal courts, and not simply because it acquits the Constitution (as currently interpreted by the judiciary) of internal inconsistency. More significantly, the ability of the four principles to coexist undermines any argument-or even any unarticulated sense subtly shaping interpretation-that one of the principles must be rejected because of the perceived inconsistency. In particular, it undermines the argument against the Madisonian Compromise based on Tarble's Case and, perhaps most importantly today, undermines any argument that seeks to rely on the Madisonian Compromise, Marbury, and Tarble's Case to contend that the Suspension Clause does not require the availability of habeas for those in federal executive custody.' 2 This Article contends that resolution to this apparent conflict lies in the power of individual Supreme Court Justices to issue writs of habeas corpus-a "power granted from 1789 to the present."
I. TIIE PIECES OF TIME PUZZLE

A. The Madisonian Compromise
Although the delegates to the Constitutional Convention agreed readily on the need for a federal judiciary in general, and a Supreme Court in particular, they disagreed about the need for inferior federal courts. Some proposed that the Constitution requires inferior federal courts; others argued that the Supreme Court should be the only fed-11 See infra notes and accompanying text. IS See infra notes 47-94 and accompanying text. SYSTEM 314 n.4 (5th ed. 2003 ) (noting that the answer to the question whether this power involves original or appellate jurisdiction "rests in obscurity").
eral court permitted by the Constitution." Ultimately, our Founders agreed to what has become known as the Madison ian Compromise and authorized Congress to decide whether inferior federal courts would or would not exist.' 5 As a result, Article 111 provides that 'The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.'" A complementary provision of Article I empowers Congress to "constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court."17 Thus, in accordance with the Madisonian Compromise, the existence of inferior courts is left to the discretion of Congress.
Congress has exercised the power to create inferior federal courts "from time to time." For example, in the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress divided the country into thirteen districts, and created a district court and a district judgeship for each district. 18 At the same time, it created a circuit court for each district (other than the districts of Maine and Kentucky) • consisting of two Justices of the Su- REV. 643, 671-72 (2004 The Court explained that the "essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, [is' that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause."27 Applying this crite-I° Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. '20, § 4, I Stat. 73, 74-75 . The eastern circuit consisted of the districts of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York, the middle circuit consisted of the districts of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia, and the southern circuit consisted of the districts of South Carolina and Georgia. The districts of Maine and Kentucky were not allocated to any circuit. Both the district court and the circuit for each district were trial courts.
don to the writ of habeas corpus, the Court concluded a few years later that habeas could be used as a method of exercising appellate jurisdiction, provided that the writ sought "the revision of a decision of an inferior court.'"28 When there is no decision of an inferior court to revise, however, the Supreme Court cannot issue the writ of habeas corpus as an exercise of appellate jurisdiction." Moreover, under Marbury, unless the case falls within the narrow category of cases allocated to the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction by Article III, it cannot issue the writ of habeas corpus as an exercise of original jurisdiction."
The terminology frequently used in this area is rather confusing: the appellate use of the writ of habeas corpus by the Supreme Court is often labeled "original," with the word placed in quotation marks to indicate that it "is not 'original' in the sense that it issues in the exercise of the Court's original jurisdiction," 81 but rather in the sense that the habeas petition is "filed in the first instance" in the Supreme Court." Although this terminology seems rather ingrained at this point, it is also rather unfortunate. A petition for a writ of certiorari is "filed in the first instance" in the Supreme Court, but no one calls it an "original" writ of certiorari for that reason. A writ of certiorari, a writ of habeas corpus, a writ of mandamus, a writ of error: all are simply mechanisms by which appellate jurisdiction can be implemented. The mere fact that some of them-including certiorari, habeas, and mandamus-also are used by some courts in the exercise of original jurisdiction does not justify dubbing some of them "original" when used to implement appellate jurisdiction.
Despite this unfortunate terminology, Marbury stands for the proposition that the Supreme Court cannot exercise genuinely original jurisdiction except in the rather limited set of cases allocated to its original jurisdiction by Article III. Cr. REV. 153, 155 ("Any legislation purporting to enlarge the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus beyond those cases specified in Article III, § 2 would, of course, be unconstitutional.").
1° Ex parte Hung Hang, 108 U.S. 552, 553 (1883) (denying a petition for habeas and noting that "except in cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, or Consuls, and those in which a State is a party," the Supreme Court only can issue habeas "For a review of the judicial decision of some interior officer or court"). 31 Oaks, supra note 29, at 155. 52 Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 667 n.1 (1996) (Sumter, J., concurrir [Vol. 46:251 executive official. The inferior federal courts might not exist, and the Supreme Court would constitutionally be barred from exercising jurisdiction over an application for habeas that did not seek the revision of a decision of an inferior court.
C. Tarble's Case: The Inability of State Courts andJudges to Issue Habeas for Those in Federal Custody
If neither the Supreme Court nor inferior federal courts were available to issue writs of habeas corpus, one might expect that the state courts would be. Indeed, the conclusion of Henry Hart's famous dialogue was that state courts "are the primary guarantors of constitutional rights, and in many cases may be the ultimate ones." 33
In Ableman v. Booth, however, the Supreme Court held that state judges and state courts could not use habeas corpus to review the legality of detention ordered by federal judges and courts. 34 The Court insisted that "it was not in the power of the State" to confer such judicial authority, because "no State can authorize one of its judges or courts to exercise judicial power, by habeas corpus or otherwise, within the jurisdiction of another and independent Government." 33 The Court held that a state could no more authorize its judges and courts to issue habeas for someone in federal custody than it could do so for someone held in another state by that other state."
Ableman was an antebellum case involving state resistance to the Fugitive Slave Act." Moreover, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, having freed Sherman Booth from federal custody after he had been convicted and sentenced by the federal district court, had gone so far as to direct its clerk to make no return to the writ of error issued by the U.S. Supreme Court." The rule established in Ableman, however, was 35 Id. The Court explained that if the application for habeas itself does not make clear that the person imprisoned is in custody under the authority of the United States, the state court or judge may issue the writ and the custodian should file a return making known his authority. Once the slate court or judge learns that the custody is under the authority of the United States, it can proceed no further. Moreover, the custodian must not actually produce the prisoner, and must refuse obedience to any state process concerning the prisoner. Id. at 523. 36 Id at 516. 37 Id. at 507. 38 Id. at 511-12.
not limited to the situation where the habeas petitioner had been placed in custody by a federal judicial order. Instead, in Tarble's Case, which involved the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by a Wisconsin court commissioner seeking discharge from the U.S. military, the Supreme Court broadly posed the question before it as follows:
Whether any judicial officer of a State has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus, or to continue proceedings under the writ when issued, for the discharge of a person held under the authority, or claim and color of the authority, of the United States, by an officer of that government. 39
The Court concluded that the' decision in Ableman "disposes alike of the claim of jurisdiction by a State court, or by a State judge, to interfere with the authority of the United States, whether that authority be exercised by a Federal officer or be exercised by a Federal tribunal."`°Q uoting Ableman extensively, the Court reiterated that state courts and judges could not be authorized to review the legality of federal detention•" The opinion was expansive:
Such being the distinct and independent character of the two governments, within their respective spheres of action, it follows that neither can intrude with its judicial process into the domain of the other, except so far as such intrusion may be necessary on the part of the National government to preserve its rightful supremacy in cases of conflict of authority. In their laws, and mode of enforcement, neither is responsible to the other.42 When Tarble's Case is added to the Madisonian Compromise and Marbmy, there might be no court, state or federal, with original jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a federal executive official. The inferior federal courts might not exist, the Supreme Court would be constitutionally barred from exercising jurisdiction over an application for habeas that did not seek the revision of a decision of an inferior court, and the state courts would be constitutionally barred from issuing habeas to test the legality of the federal custody. With neither the inferior federal courts nor state courts available, the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction likewise would be unavailable because there would be no inferior court judgment to subject to revision. 741, 750-53, 793 (1984) [hereinafter Clinton, Guided Quest] (distinguishing the positions and making clear acceptance of the power of Congress to choose not to create inferior federal courts); ef. Collins, supra note 14, at 131 (noting that it was justice Joseph Story's theory of mandatory vesting, "coupled with the pervasive understanding that the states were incapable of handling some Article Ill trial business, that pushed him to speculate on the requirement of lower federal courts"). (2003) (arguing against the constitutionality of adding to the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction and raising concerns about Congress using "jurisdiction-packing" to overwhelm the Court); (I, FALLON ET AL., supra note 13, at 345 n.26 (not, ing that a broad usage of the term "courts" is "necessarily fuzzy at the borders, due to the practical and conceptual difficulty of distinguishing non-Article III courts from administrative agencies or other bodies charged with applying fact to law"); Akhil Reed Aniar, Mar- Pfander, supra note 17, at 723-24 (noting the "lingering confusion" over the extent to which Marbury limits the Supreme Court's power "to review the work ()Ian Article I tribunal" and suggesting that it "poses a threat . . most pointedly in cases where the court below is (like a court martial) not a court of record and the process of review contemplates active judicial lactfinding and the entry of judgment."). 58 See, e.g., Everett v. Truman, 334 U.S. 824, 824 (1948) (denying leave to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus for "relief front sentences upon the verdicts of a General Military Government Court at Dachau, Germany," with !bur justices finding a lack of jurisdiction, four Justices urgingI leave .eave to file be granted and the case set for argument, and one Justice (Justice Robert Jackson) not participatin!;); see also 161i CHARLES 4%1 'I. ! WRIGHT Fr AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §400 .!7:,1; 101 (2d ed. 1996) 1 . Is a major certain kind of military tribunal may count as a "court,"59 to treat any official who decides to restrain someone as a "court" would be inconsistent with Marbury: if an official who makes a decision to restrain a person is thereby a "court," so too is a person who makes a decision to withhold a document from a person. Although Charles Lee, arguing in William Marbury's behalf, advocated a conception of appellate jurisdicdon sufficiently broad to reach that case, 60 the Court rejected that argument, concluding that "the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, [is] that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause" and that to issue mandamus "to an officer, for the delivery of a paper, is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that paper." 6 '
5°
In Ex parte Quinn, counsel for Nazi saboteurs sought leave to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court. 62 The Supreme Court called a special term and scheduled the matter for oral argument.° Before oral argument, however, counsel also filed a habeas petition in the district court.64 While oral argument in the Supreme Court was proceeding, counsel perfected an appeal to the court of appeals from the district court's denial of relief. 65 The Supreme Court denied leave to file the habeas petition, but granted certiorari before judgment in the court of appeals to review the decision of the district court. 66 It appears that counsel for the saboteurs originally thought that they could seek habeas directly in the Supreme Court without first seeking relief in an inferior court until Justice Owens Roberts reminded them of Marbury.67 theoretical uncertainty as to the nature of the tribunals whose action is so far judicial that initial revisory jurisdiction qualifies as 'appellate.'"). 59 See FALLoN Er AL., supra note 13, at 316-18 (discussing Elirota v. MacArthur; 338 U. S. 197 (1948) 576-77 (1930) (explaining that although le] arly and long continued usage" treats certification of a distinct question of law as an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has "uniformly ruled" that it would not entertain certifications of the whole case "kw otherwise it would be assuming original jurisdiction withheld from it by the Constitution"); Ex parte Barry, 43 U.S. (I How.) 65, 65--66 (1844) (dismissing a petition for a writ or habeas corpus claiming that the petitioner's infant daughter was being detained unlawfully by the child's grandmother, and holding that it involved the exercise of original jurisdiction); White v. Turk, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 238, 239 (1838) (finding no jurisdiction because the certificate "brings the whole cause before this court; and if we were to decide the questions presented, it would, in effect, be the exercise of original, rather than appellate, jurisdiction").
6r4 Daniell Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 8(1 GEO. Li. 2537, 25(17 (1998) . Professor Meltzer concedes "that there is much language in the decision to support the view that the Constitution itself precludes state courts horn exercising habeas jurisdiction to challenge the legality of detention at the behest of federal officials." Id. at 2567 11.160; so? Richard S. Arnold, The Power of State Courts to Enjoin Federal Weer -5, 73 lin tx, U. 1385 , 14(16 (1964 (noting that he would "cheerfully accept" a conclusion that state courts can issue habeas corpus); John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEo. L.J. 2513, 2514 n.4 (1998) (describing himself as "one of many Thrble skeptics" and stating that "Congress's power to exclude cases from state court conies only from its power to put them exclusively in federal court, and that the Constitution of its own force does not keep any case out of state court that could be brought in the federal system"); Lawrence Gene Sager, Constitutional Limitation.; on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HAttv. L. REV. 17, 84 (1981) (noting that if Congress were to abolish the lower federal courts, Tarble's rule would be critical, but "then the implications a the article Ill compromise make it wrong"). 69 Meltzer, supra note 68, at 2567 n.160. Indeed, even Martin H. Redish Tarble 's Case is that it reflects the Court's conclusion that Congress had invested only the federal courts with habeas jurisdiction to review the legality of federal detention" and that "to permit a state court to exercise jurisdiction would conflict with the federal statutory scheme established by Congress." 71 For those who seek to downgrade Tarble's Case from a constitutional decision to a subconstitutional one, the case can be conceptualized as involving either statutory interpretation or a federal common law of state-federal relations. 72
Professor George Rutherglen agrees with these critics that the "square holding" of Tarble's Case "must be qualified" in that the "door to the state courts could be closed only if the door to the federal courts remained open."75 He points to the Suspension Clause, arguing that without this qualification, the result could be a "suspension of the writ of habeas corpus." 4
D. Eviscerating the Suspension Clause
The principle that the Suspension Clause guarantees habeas corpus for those in federal executive detention (unless validly suspended in accordance with the Suspension Clause itself) has not escaped criticism. To the contrary, justice Antonin Scalia has argued that the Suspension Clause does not "guarantee any content to (or even existence of) the writ of habeas corpus." 75 On this view, although the Suspension Clause limits the power of Congress to "temporarily withh [o] ld operation of the writ," it in no way restricts congressional power to alter permanently its content, just as the Equal Protection Clause guards "against unequal application of the laws, without guaranteeing any par- Although all of these methods succeed in eliminating the conflict among the four principles, they "solve" the constitutional puzzle in the same way that one "solves" a jigsaw puzzle with scissors. To clip off the Madisonian Compromise and to insist that inferior federal courts are constitutionally required would be to discard a central element of our constitutional architecture that is reflected in the debates of the Constitutional Convention, and the text of the Constitution, and that is fixed by more than two centuries of practice." To slice the holding of Marbury out of our constitutional jurisprudence would not only reject what "has ever since [Marbury] been accepted as fixing the construction of this part of the Constitution," but also deface, if not destroy, a constitutional icon. 80 m Id. at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 77 See id. at 341 n.5 (Scalia, j., dissenting). Although Justice Antonin Scalia in this footnote states that such permanent repeal is not "unthinkable," the context demonstrates that he does not believe it would be unconstitutional. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) .
78 See FALLON Er AL, supra note 13, at 1291 ("A claimed right to habeas review in federal court bumps up against the constitutional understanding (already accepted by the Constitutional Convention when the Suspension Clause was adopted) that it was for Congress to decide whether to create lower federal courts at all."); (f. Neuman, supra note 74, at 1053 (noting that if Congress abolished the lower federal courts "the remedial question would become inure difficult but that is not the world in which we live"). Trimming the traditional view of the Suspension Clause so as to authorize Congress simply to eliminate the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus would come close to lopping that clause from the Constitution. Professor Gerald L. Neuman finds justice Scalia's interpretation so surprising that he wonders if it "may be an error to take [it] seriously."81 Justice Scalia's interpretation of the Suspension Clause, for example, would leave the people in the Northwest Territory with less protection from such restriction on their liberty than before the ratification of the Constitution. The Northwest Ordinance guaranteed that the "inhabitants of the said territory shall always be entitled to the benefits of the writ[] of habeas corpus," and promised that this guarantee would inure to "the people and States in the said territory, and forever remain unalterable, unless by common consent."82 Indeed, it would leave the people of the United States less protected from lawless executive detention than British subjects in 1679. 83
It is true, as justice Scalia emphasized in INS v. Si. Cyr,84 that federal courts lack inherent authority to issue writs of habeas corpus and only can exercise such authority when authorized by Congress. 85 But to conclude from this premise that there is no constitutional obligation to make habeas available for those in federal custody depends on 81 Neuman, supra note 46, at 562. Professor Neuman nevertheless proceeds to provide ample reason to reject justice Scalia's interpretation. hi. at 570-87. It bears emphasis, however, that when armed with habeas jurisdiction, justice Scalia insists that an American citizen detained within the territorial jurisdiction of a federal court either must be prosecuted criminally or released. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. CL 2633 , 2660 , 2671 , 2673 (2004 (Scalia, j., dissenting). Indeed, in such circumstances, Justice Scalia has a robust conception of the Suspension Clause:
If the Suspension Clause does not guarantee the citizen that he will either be tried or released, unless the conditions for suspending the writ exist and the grave action of suspending the writ has been taken; if it merely guarantees the citizen that he will not be detained unless Congress by ordinary legislation says he can be detained; it guarantees him very little indeed.
Id. at 2672 (Scalia, j., dissenting). If our judge-focused contemporary legal culture makes it difficult to see this point, consider the constitutional obligation of Congress to provide for the establishment of the Supreme Court itself.87 There is little doubt of this constitutional requirement, but if Congress failed to do so, no group of "judges" could declare themselves the Supreme Court of the United States and start exercising that court's jurisdiction.
The obligation to provide for the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is parallel to the obligation to provide for the establishment of the Supreme Court. Consider in this light Chief Justice John Marshall's famous statement about the obligation imposed by the Suspension Clause on the first Congress:
Acting under the immediate influence of this injunction, they must have felt, with peculiar force, the obligation of providing efficient means by which this great constitutional privilege should receive life and activity; for if the means be not in existence, the privilege itself would be lost, although no law for its suspension should be enacted. Under the impression of this obligation, they give, to all the courts, the power of awarding writs of habeas corpus. 88
Chief Justice Marshall's reasoning applies equally to the constitutional obligation of Congress to provide for the establishment of the Su- 531, 575-85 (2000) (emphasizing the importance of the power of individual judges to issue writs of habeas corpus, while criticizing the decision in Ex pane Bollman); NCUM:111, supra note 74, at 970 (noting that the difficulty of determining the meaning of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus based on eighteenth-century practice is "enhanced by the fact that writs were often issued by individual judges acting in chambers, rather than as courts"). Boston College Law Reviero (Vol. 46:251 was the freestanding grant of habeas power to the individual Justices that led the Court to conclude that the Court itself had this power. 98 Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court in Ex parte Bollman, found "much force" in the argument that "[Ciongress could never intend to give a power of this kind to one of the judges of this court, which is refused to all of them when assembled."99 He added, It would be strange if the judge, sitting on the bench, should be unable to hear a motion for this writ where it might be openly made, and openly discussed, and might yet retire to his chamber, and in private receive and decide upon the motion. This is not consistent with the genius of our legislation, nor with the course of our judicial proceedings. It would be much more consonant with both, that the power of the judge at his chambers should be suspended during his term, than that it should be exercised only in secret.
Whatever motives might induce the legislature to withhold from the supreme court the power to award the great writ of habeas corpus, there could be none which would induce them to withhold it from every court in the United States: and as it is granted to all in the same sentence and by the same words, the sound construction would seem to be, that the first sentence vests this power in all the courts of the United States; but as agreeable to the principles and usages of law"). The ambiguity is whether the restrictive clause ("which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions") modifies the entire list of writs ("scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs") or only the last item on the list ("all other writs"). See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) (noting that the "only doubt of which this section can be susceptible is, whether the restrictive words of the first sentence limit the power to the award of such writs of habeas corpus as are necessary to enable the courts of the United States to exercise their respective jurisdictions"); James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court's Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEx. L. REv. 1433 REv. , 1479 REv. -83 (2000 (arguing that the test or necessity applies only to "all other writs" and not to the named writs, but noting that Chief Justice Marshall "largely based his conclusion iii favor of the Court's power to grant the 'great writ' of habeas corpus on an additional collection of structural considerations"). those courts arc not always in session, the second sentence vests it in every justice or judge of the United States. 10°I ndeed, even Justice William Johnson, dissenting in Bollnzan, emphasized that he was "not disputing the power of the individual judges who compose this court to issue the writ of habeas corpus. This application is not made to us as at chambers, but to us as holding the supreme court of the United States "iol This vesting of power in individual Justices and judges to grant writs of habeas corpus is not some fluke of the Judiciary Act of 1789. When Congress expanded the reach of federal habeas corpus in 1833 and in 1842, it again vested the power in individual Justices and judges, rather than explicitly in the courts. 102 When Congress extended federal habeas still further in 1867, it explicitly conferred habeas power on the federal courts, but continued to confer that power on individual Justices and judges as well.'"
We may in our individual capacities, or in our circuit courts, be susceptible of powers merely ministerial, and not inconsistent with our judicial characters, for on that point the constitution has left much to construction; and on such an application the only doubt that could be entertained would be, whether we can exercise any power beyond the limits of our respective circuits. On this question I will riot now give an opinion. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 4, 26 Stat. 826, 827 (providing that "no appeal ... shall hereafter be taken or allowed kir any district court to the existing circuit courts, anti( ;.tmellate jurisdiction shall hereafter be exer...ised or alloWed by said existing circuit cm This basic framework, empowering both federal courts and federal judges individually to issue writs of habeas corpus, remains in force. Today, the basic federal habeas statute provides that "Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. "104 Moreover, the power of individual judges to issue writs of habeas corpus has historical roots still deeper than the Judiciary Act of 1789. In reaction to the refusal of British judges to issue a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Francis jenkes because the writ could not be issued out of term, 105 the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 specifically empowered individual judges to issue habeas.' 06 William Blackstone ex-1°4 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a) (2000) . Although statutes frequently are interpreted to refer to "court" and 'judge" interchangeably, that interpretation of a given statute is not inevitable. See In re United States, 194 U.S. 194, 196-97, 198-200 (1904) The Supreme Court, a justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 137 (2d Cir. 1981 ) (dismissing a petition for habeas corpus made to the court of appeals and noting that a "court of appeals is conspicuously absent from this list").
Id. ( Johnson, J., dissenting).
Id.; see In re
The current statute requires an application addressed to an individual Justice to "state the reasons for not making application to the district court of the district in which the applicant is held." 28 U.S.C. § 2242. It also permits an individual Justice to whom an application for habeas is made to "transfer the application for hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction to entertain it." Ray. 981, 1017 Ray. 981, -18 (1964 (describing the power of an individual Justice to issue habeas as of "no practical importance" and asserting that a single Justice is not "an appropriate forum for original habeas proceedings"); cf. Bowen v. Johnston, 55 F. Stipp, 340, 343 (N.H. Cal. 1944 ) (Denman, Circuit Judge, in chambers) (noting that "ME -a district judge is not available," a habeas petitioner may seek one of the circuit judges, and if "by an extraordinary circumstance none of these is then there, he may seek any of the justices of the Supreme Court and the Chief Justice" , 1987) (concluding that the Habeas Corpus Act's provision for action by a judge in vacation was "not meant to give a power which they did not exercise before, but to reduce an unsettled, informal, vague practice, into a formal regular system, as to the bailing for bailable offenses, and to correct. the abuse of any power which they had in fact exercised"), available at littp://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/al_9_2s3.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2005) ; 2 HENRY HALLAM, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY or ENGLAND 175-78 (Garland Publ'g 1978) (1846) (referring to Francis jenkes and stating that the Habeas Corpus Act made clear that a single judge could issue the writ during the vacation, but questioning how much the flatter of Francis jenkes contributed to the passage of the Act).
I" 3 BiAcKsToNE, supra note 106, at *131; see, e.g., Wyeth v. Richardson, 76 Mass. (10 Gray) 240, 241-42 (1857) (Shaw, CJ.) (noting that the power to issue habeas in vacation "is a special power; conferred by statute, to be used by a judge as judge, not ;AS a court; though if the court is in session when the writ is returned, the judge may adjourn the case into court"); 
A. Consistency with the Madisonian Compromise
Under the Madisonian Compromise, although the existence of the inferior courts is subject to Congress's discretion, the establishment of the U.S. Supreme Court is not. The Supreme Court is constitutionally obligatory; Congress must provide for its establishment.m As the Supreme Court once put it, "[s]o long, therefore, as this Constitution shall endure, this tribunal must exist with it." 109
The Constitution does not set the size of the Supreme Court, and Congress has varied its size over the years.' 10 Nevertheless, because there must be a Supreme Court, it must have judges or Justices, even if Congress does not create any lower federal courts. The power of Supreme Court justices to issue writs of habeas corpus, as they have from 1789 until today, presents no conflict with the Madisonian Compromise.
B. Consistency with Tarble's Case
Tarble's Case, like Ableman v. Booth before it, concluded that "'no State can authorize one of its judges or courts to exercise judicial power, by haveas corpus or otherwise, within the jurisdiction of another and independent government."" Tarble's Case, however, stands as no impediment to individual Justices of the Supreme Court issuing writs of habeas corpus to determine the legality of federal custody.
Moreover, both Ableman and Tarble's Case themselves illustrate that individual judges long have been given the power to issue writs of habeas corpus. The state involvement in Ableman began with an individual justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court issuing a writ of habeas corpus returnable before himself." 2 The Ableman Court spoke of the limitation on both state judges and courts, referring to the two as a couplet more than half a dozen times)" Similarly, state involvement in Tarble's Case began with a court commissioner issuing a writ of habeas corpus returnable before himself at his office.'" Tarble's Case also repeatedly spoke of both state judges and courts.' ' 5
C. Consistency with the Suspension Clause
If the individual Justices of the Supreme Court have the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to determine the legality of those in federal custody, the privilege of the writ has not been suspended. Seeking the writ from an individual Justice may be less convenient-for both the petitioner and the Justice-than seeking it from a local federal district judge or, for that matter, from a local state judge. Nonetheless, so long as there is a set of judicial officers with the power to issue the writ, it is difficult to claim that habeas corpus has been suspended."
D. Consistency with Marbury
The key question, then, is whether the exercise of habeas jurisdiction by individual Justices of the Supreme Court is consistent with Marbury's limitation on the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Although it may seem odd, at first blush, to conclude that the individual Justices 115 Id. at 515 (ludges and courts"); id. at 515-16 ("judges or courts"); id. at 523 ("court, or judge"); id. ("court or judge"); id. ("judge or court"); id, ("judge or court"); id. at 524 ("judge or court"); id, ('judge or court").
I " See 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 398. 115 Id. at 404 ("State court, or by a State judge"); id. at 400 ("State judges and State courts"); id. ("judge or court"); see id, at 402 ("any judicial officer of a State"); see also id. at 411 (stating that "it is for the courts or judicial officers of the United States" to release a party who is illegally imprisoned under the authority of the United States); id. (declaring that federal "courts and judicial officers are clothed with the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus"); cf. Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624,637-38 (1884) (recognizing "the authority or a state court, or one of its judges, upon writ of habeas corpus," to test the legality under federal law of slate custody).
Its See Neuman, supra note 74, at 975-76 (observing that it is conceivable that the Suspension Clause be read as "self-enforcing once the federal courts had been brought into existence," but that "it might not have been self-evident which federal courts or judges should have jurisdiction to issue the writ, given the likelihood that the Suspension Clause does not require that they all must").
Perhaps if the number of judicial officers empowered to issue habeas were so sniall compared to the number of detainees seeking habeas that relief effectively was denied, one might conclude that habeas effectively had been suspended. Because neither the number of such detainees nor the number of justices is fixed by the Constitution, however, this possibility does not mean that the Suspension Clause necessarily requires that slalt. courts and judges or inferior federal courts and judges also have the power to issue hal-• .,irpus, [Vol. 46:251 may exercise original jurisdiction when the Supreme Court itself cannot, 117 this is the correct conclusion. As Professor William Duker once put it, the "Constitution specifically limits the original jurisdiction of the Court, though the individual justice in chambers or on circuit is subject to no such limit. "118
As discussed above, the law has long distinguished between the acts of an individual judge and the acts of a court, particularly with regard to the issuance of habeas corpus." 9 A major contribution of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 was its clarification that an individual judge had the power and obligation to issue habeas even when the court was not in session. In the particular context of habeas corpus, although the Justices of the Supreme Court in Bollmqn disagreed on whether the Court itself could issue the writ, there was no dispute that the individual Justices could do so.' 24 Justice Johnson implored that it be "remembered that I am not disputing the power of the individual judges who compose this court to issue the writ of habeas corpus. This application is not made to us as at chambers, but to us as holding the supreme court of the United States . ..." 125 Indeed, perhaps the most famous and controversial writ of habeas corpus ever issued in the United States-the one defied by President Abraham Lincoln-was issued by Chief Justice Roger Taney in (1803) (stating that "the question is at rest, and ought not now to be disturbed"). Fur the same reason, the constitutionality of permitting the judges of courts, riot simply the courts themselves, to issue writs of habeas corpus and thereby to exercise the "judicial power of the United States" vested in courts by Article 111, should be treated as settled. Indeed, as we have seen, the ability of individual judges to issue habeas nut only has been part of our law since the Judiciary Act of 1789, but also is rooted in British practice and the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679. See .supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 777 (2000) (treating historical practice in both Great Britain and the United States as "well nigh conclusive" in deciding that qui lam actions are "'cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process'' (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)) Justice Felix Frankfurter famously explained, The Constitution is a framework for government. Therefore the way the framework has consistently operated fairly establishes that it has operated according 10 its true nature. Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the words of a text or supply them. It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Co. 1999) (1833) (finding "the distinction between a court and its judge. from ... illegal or unconstitutional," but nevertheless rejecting the idea that "the n• the Supreme Court may also be judges of inferior and subordinate courts"). Judge William E Giles was not sitting with him because it was not a session of the Circuit Court but rather a proceeding before the Chief Justice at chambers.'" If there was any doubt about the constitutional power of an individual Justice to exercise original jurisdiction in cases outside the Supreme Court's own original jurisdiction, surely President Lincoln and his Attorney General would have raised the argument, particularly given the far-reaching arguments they did make.
President Lincoln himself asserted that the President had the power, without congressional authorization, to suspend habeas and intimated that, even if this constitutional interpretation were wrong, he was nonetheless right to violate the Constitution, asking, "are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?" t 33 Attorney General Edward Bates 129 See TYLER, supra note 126, at app. at 642 (reproducing order that the writ he issued "by Thomas Spicer, clerk of the Circuit Court of the United States in and for the District of Maryland," returnable "before me, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States"); Id. (reproducing the writ itself, commanding General Cadwalader "to be and appear before the Honorable ROGER B. TANEY, Chief . justice of the Supreme Court of the United States," and "receive whatsoever the said Chief' Justice shall determine upon concerning you on this behalf"). Fay v Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 407 (1963) (stating that "the habeas jurisdiction of the other federal courts and judges, including the individual _Justices of the Supreme Court, has generally been deemed original"). Metzger might be read as limited to the extradition context, where a district judge can be understood to be exercising a non-judicial "special authority." See 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 191; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (providing that "any justice or judge of the United States" as well as certain magistrates and state judges, but not any courts, may conduct extradition proceedings); LoDuca v. United States, 93 F.3d 1100 , 1105 (2d Cir. 1996 (reasoning that "1rJresumably, the Court was describing the role of the district judge rather than the place of his decision-making, since the Court later noted that the judge was exercising 'a special authority' for which no provision existed regarding the appealability of his decisions"); In re Mackin, 668 F.2d at 125, 129 (Friendly, J.) (tracing the inability to appeal extradition orders to Metzger's conclusion that an extradition judge exercises a special authority and holding that such an order is not a final decision of a "district court" subject to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000)). But see Parry, supra, Metzger also might stand for the proposition that because appellate jurisdiction involves the revision of another court's judgment and an individual judge in chand
• not holding court, an in-chambers decision itself cannot be, as a constitutional mane , edicate for [Vol. 46:251 When the Supreme Court's own jurisdiction is at issue, it is important to decide whether the particular case involves original or appellate jurisdiction because the Court's constitutionally permissible original jurisdiction is limited. For that reason, whether an individual justice may refer a petition for habeas corpus to the full court de-, pends on whether the jurisdiction at issue is original or appellate. It was in this context that the Supreme Court addressed the proper characterization of the habeas jurisdiction of individual Justices.
In In re Kaine, an alleged fugitive From Great Britain was brought before a U.S. Commissioner pursuant to an extradition treaty and was ordered committed."' The U.S. Circuit Court, District Judge Samuel R.
Betts presiding, refused a writ of habeas corpus, and Thomas Kaine presented a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to Justice Samuel Nelson at chambers. Justice Nelson granted the writ, but rather than making a final disposition, ordered that the case be heard "before all the Justices of the Supreme Court in bank, at the commencement of the next term" keeping Thomas Kaine in the custody of a marshal until then.142 Upon argument before the Supreme Court, the Court assumed that Justice Nelson's action involved original jurisdiction, and therefore concluded that his attempted transfer to the full court was invalid. 143 the exercise of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. See 46 U.S. at 191 (stating that the question of jurisdiction arises because the district judge acted "at his chambers, and /101 in court"); id. at 189 (stating that "it is said" that United States u Hamilton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795), involved "an original exercise of jurisdiction by the [Supreme' court, as it does not appear that the district judge was holding a court at the time of the commitment" on a charge of treason, but noting that the issue of jurisdiction was not considered); id. at 180 (noting the argument of Coxe, counsel for petitioner, that "this court has held, that, in awarding this writ, it does so in the exercise of appellate and not original jurisdiction, and that a doubt has been expressed whether, this being a proceeding before the district judge at chambers, this court can exercise any revisory power over it").
However Metzger is interpreted, it does nothing to call into question the power of indi- In Ex parse Clarke, however, the Court upheld the power of an individual Justice to refer a habeas matter to the full Court. 145 Augustus Clarke, a member of the city council of Cincinnati, was convicted in a U.S. Circuit Court for failing to perform certain duties involving a federal election and presented a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to Justice William Strong. 148 Justice Strong granted the writ, "returnable forthwith before himself, at the Catskill Mountain House." 147 Upon the return, Justice Strong postponed the hearing of the case into the full Court until its next term. 148
The government objected that this procedure was invalid under Kaine, a point that the Court "considered ... with some care." 148 The Court explained that the "ground taken" in Kaine was that "the writ had been issued by [Justice Nelson] in virtue of his original jurisdiction." 180 But in this case, however it may have been in that, it is clear that the writ, whether acted upon by the justice who issued it, or by this court, would in fact require a revision of the action of the Circuit Court by which the petitioner was cornjustice Benjamin Curtis, speaking for himself, emphasized the difference between the individual Justice and the Court, stating that an individual justice "in vacation, at his chambers, has no power to grant a writ of habeas corpus out of this court" because only the full Court could do so, and that an individual Justice similarly lacks power "to make such a writ returnable before himself, and then adjourn it into term." M. at 118. He therelbre agreed with every other justice that the Court could not act under justice Nelson's writ. Id.
Nonetheless, he rejected the conclusion, accepted by every other justice, that the Court could issue habeas in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, concluding that the cause of Thomas Kaine's commitment was not the act of the Circuit Court, but instead the act of the Commissioner, and therefore the petition called for an exercise of original jurisdic-mitted, and such revision would necessarily be appellate in character. This appellate character of the proceeding attaches to a large portion of cases on habeas corpus, whether issued by a single judge or by a court. 151
Significantly, the Court added that the appellate feature is "no objection to the issue of the writ by the associate justice, and is essential to the jurisdiction of this court." 152 That is, although the power of the Court itself to issue habeas, whether directly or on referral from an individual Justice, depends on whether the particular case involves original or appellate jurisdiction, an individual justice has the power to grant habeas whether the particular case involves original or appellate jurisdiction. Put slightly differently, the power of an individual Justice to issue a writ of habeas corpus is both original and appellate: appellate if the particular case involves the revision of another court's judgment, and original if the particular case does not
In Kaine, the Court assumed that individual Justices could not exercise the appellate power of the Court itself, and did not discuss whether the individual power vested in Justices might, in some cases, properly be characterized as appellate. In Clarke, by contrast, the Court was untroubled by the prospect of individual Justices exercising appellate power via habeas, noting that an individual Justice can issue habeas "in any part of the United States where he happens to be," and can "undoubtedly ... dispose[] of the case himself," although if "the case is one of which this court also has jurisdiction," and is "of great moment and difficulty," the Justice may postpone the case to the whole Court. 153 [Iln all cases where a Circuit Court of the United States has, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, caused a prisoner to be brought before it, and has, after inquiring into the cause of detention, remanded him to the custody from which he was taken, this court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, may, by the writ of habeas corpus, aided by the writ of certiorari, revise the decision of the Circuit Court, and if it be found unwarranted by law, relieve the prisoner from the unlawful restraint to which he has been remanded. Although both cases wrestled with the interaction between the power of an individual Justice to grant habeas and the limitation on the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, neither case suggested the least doubt that an individual Justice could exercise original habeas jurisdiction, notwithstanding the constitutional limitations on the Supreme Court's own original jurisdiction. This is dramatically illustrated by the aftermath of the Kaine case: even though at least seven Justices, including Justice Nelson himself, already had stated that his power as an individual Justice in that case involved the exercise of original jurisdiction, he nevertheless subsequently exercised that jurisdiction to discharge Thomas Kaine from custody. 154
Later developments have called into doubt Clarke 's robust view of an individual Justice's power to take action that effectively decides an appeal unilaterally. 155 For example, although individual Justices are empowered by statute to grant stays pending certiorari, 156 they are quite reluctant to do so when it effectively would decide the case on the merits. 157 Similarly, although individual Justices are empowered by of the United States [citing Clarke]; but such is not the usual course, and is not to be followed if it can well be avoided.... The law gives jurisdiction to, and places the responsibility upon, a single judge to grant or refuse the wish; and it is his duty to decide an application therefore if he can do so with reasonable confidence in his own conclusion; and it is his right to do so in every case. (Cynthia Rapp ed., 2004) (noting that if the proceedings leading to the conviction were void in a legal sense no doubt 1 might issue a habeas corpus simply as anyone having authority to issue the writ might do so"). 154 See Ex parte Kaine, 14 F. Cas. 78, 82 155 See Rapp, supra note 104, at 183 n.5 (referring to a 1944 letter from the Clerk's Office as indicating "that although a justice might have the power to grant a petition of habeas corpus, it was a well-established practice that such applications would be considered by the full Court"). It would appear that Cynthia J. Rapp is referring only to habeas petitions calling for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, for she makes no attempt to explain how the Court could entertain an application for habeas that called for the exercise of original jurisdiction beyond the cases allocated to the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction by Article III. that one factor considered in stay applications is a "concern that to grant a stay Lively he to determine the case on the merits, a power not otherwise vested in the bid.
.sites"). At the outset, this Article posited a situation in which someone detained by the federal executive sought to challenge the legality of his detention, but could not turn to the infeerior federal courts because they did not exist, could not turn to the Supreme Court because of Marbury, and could not turn to the state courts because of Thrble's Case. Even though no one-not Congress, not the Supreme Court, and not the state courts-could be faulted for violating the Constitution, might it be that the privilege of the writ would be unavailable? We can now say that there is some place to which the detainee could go, the chambers of any Justice of the Supreme Court, 1 " See Nam's, 72 S. Ct. at 1021 (noting that although an individual justice has the power to grant the writ, it would not be appropriate, absent a showing of exceptional circumstances, to do so until the petitioner "exhausts his remedies by certiorari to this Court").
No matter how one interprets Locks, it would be a mistake to rely too heavily upon it as authority. Justice Douglas specifically noted that the issue he raised was "not briefed or argued in the papers which have been submitted," that the "shortness of time (less than one day) allowed [to him] for consideration of the application [did not] permii [lind even to explore" it, and that his decision was "without prejudice to any future rulimt ' .
•vas based "solely on the narrow compass of the authorities submitted." Locks, 89 S. and that there is no constitutional impediment to the exercise of habeas power by an individual Justice.
Moreover, by defending the Suspension Clause, the argument in this Article bolsters the longstanding interpretive canon that statutes should be construed, when possible, to preserve the availability of habeas. 165 Indeed, it adds another layer: even if a statute clearly removes habeas jurisdiction from courts, it might not remove it clearly from individual Justices.
But what if Congress were clearly and unambiguously to close this door, too? If the arguments made in this Article are correct, then if Congress was to make no provision at all for habeas corpus, it would stand in violation of the Suspension Clause. Although this Article does not contend that individual Justices have an inherent power to issue writs of habeas corpus, nor that they could issue such writs without congressional authorization, Congress could not defend its failure to make any provision for habeas by pointing to the Madisonian Compromise, Marbury, and 7'arble's Case, because it had another option: far from having to create inferior federal courts, or to challenge Marbury or Tarble's Case, it simply could have empowered individual Justices to issue writs of habeas corpus.
Some may think that, absent an argument for an inherent power in individual Justices to issue habeas corpus, there is no difference between the situation we confronted at the outset of the Article and the one we can see now: in either case, the federal detainee cannot obtain habeas relief unless Congress has granted habeas jurisdiction either to inferior federal courts or to individual Justices. But there is an important difference: in the earlier situation, it appeared impossible to find a constitutional violation of the Suspension Clause without jettisoning an existing constitutional principle; now we can.
This insight not only should shape judicial interpretation of statutes, but also-because constitutional interpretation matters to Congress, the President, and the citizenry, as well as to judges-this insight should affect the statutes that get enacted. Congress should always feel "with peculiar force, the obligation of providing efficient means by which this great constitutional privilege should receive life and activity." 166
